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PRICE NEGOTIATION 
STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY 
SHIPPERS OF INTERNATIONAL 






Government regulations in the international air and ocean shipping industry have undergone 
a wide range of new developments geared towards deregulation. These changes, coupled with 
the emergence of new technologies, have facilitated foreign trade operations leading to a 
substantial increase in international air and ocean cargo traffic in recent years.
This study investigates the regulation reforms that have affected pricing techniques in both 
industries and their implications on the negotiation strategies adopted by shippers and 
carriers. The survey results identified that each shipping firm negotiated on a variety of 
issues and employed more than one strategy for negotiating price.
INTRODUCTION
Globalization and international transporta­
tion have gained prominence more than ever 
before in the later half of the twentieth 
century. The relaxation of U.S. government 
regulations through the deregulation of both 
the air and ocean industries contributed to 
an increase in international air and ocean 
cargo traffic. Coupled with emerging advance­
ments in technology in the 1990’s, there has 
been a significant decrease in the complexi­
ties associated with the movement, storage, 
and tracking of international consignments, 
thereby facilitating foreign trade operations. 
Together, both of these factors have played a 
vital role in the facilitation of global trade. 
As a result, many firms now pursue global 
sourcing to utilize worldwide resources and 
worldwide technology more efficiently to
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create a competitive advantage for them­
selves in the marketplace (Thomchick 2000).
This study provides a turn-of-the-century 
view of the regulations that have governed 
rate-making so far in both the international 
air and ocean shipping industries. The 
changes that occurred in the rate making 
process in the post-deregulated era in both 
industries are identified. In the case of the 
air transport industry, the most recent 
development in regulation was that of the 
‘open skies’ bilateral air service agreements 
that began in the United States in 1992 
(Doganis 2001). In the case of the ocean 
transport industry, the Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998 was the most 
significant development, completely altering 
the way shippers and carriers conducted 
business with each other.
These changes laid the foundation for this 
study. Although much research has been 
conducted on the impact of deregulation 
reforms on the air freight and ocean cargo 
industry, no study to date has performed an 
analysis of the price negotiation strategies 
employed by international shippers in the 
post-deregulated era. Thus, the objective of 
this study is to perform an analysis of price 
negotiation strategies adopted by shippers of 
international air and ocean transportation in 
the post-deregulated era. From a more micro 
view, the research examines the price nego­
tiation strategies adopted by a selected 
sample of shippers of international air and 
ocean cargo. The study provides valuable 
information on the negotiation strategies and 
carrier selection practices employed by a 
selected sample of international shippers of 
diverse goods. All international shippers 
should benefit from this knowledge since 
these strategies represent current industry 
practices.
The research began with a review of the 
literature on the deregulation reforms that 
impacted the different approaches adopted in 
rate making in the air freight and ocean 
cargo industries. A survey of international 
shipping firms was then conducted by 
sending out a structured questionnaire via e- 
mail. The survey provided information on the 
factors that influence the carrier selection 
process and the price negotiation strategies 
adopted by the respondents. Conclusions 
were drawn regarding the negotiation stra­
tegies and carrier selection practices adopted 
by the sample.
LITERATURE REVIEW
International Air Transport 
Regulation and Cargo Pricing
Until the early 1930’s, air was employed 
primarily for the transport of passengers. The 
usage of air for transporting cargo began in the 
early 1930's when airlines started transporting 
airmail (Williams, 1994). National Air 
Transport, organized in 1926, was the pioneer 
that employed airlines for the transport of all 
property other than mail and passengers’ 
baggage (Williams 1994). However, after the 
establishment of the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB), through the passage of the Civil Aero­
nautics Act in 1938, many carriers began to 
show interest in the air freight business 
(Williams 1994; Taneja 1980).
United Airlines initiated all-cargo service by 
offering the first domestic service between 
New York and Chicago in December 1940. 
American, United, and TWA followed suit by 
offering regular transcontinental cargo 
service from 1945 onwards (Williams 1994). 
At the same time in 1944, an agreement was 
reached in an intergovernmental conference 
in Chicago establishing a global association
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for overseeing the rate making process. In 
April 1945, the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) was formed for the 
purpose of rate making.
The final structure of the IATA resulted from 
the signing of the Air Services agreement in 
Bermuda in 1946 (Williams 1994). IATA’s 
rate making process included the following 
steps. The rate fixing machinery initially 
arrived at a comprehensive pattern of 
specified fares on the basis of certain basic 
currencies, including the U.S. Dollar and the 
Pound Sterling. The specified fares were 
approved by the members of the IATA. The 
fares of individual carriers were based on 
their specific needs and calculated after con­
sidering various factors that influenced the 
tariff rates both directly and indirectly 
(Williams 1994). These factors included 
distance, cost of service, price elasticity of 
demand, specific needs of carriers serving 
particular trade lanes, government needs, 
anticipated demand patterns, availability 
and nature of competition in specific routes 
(Williams 1994).
The CAB approved the IATA traffic confer­
ence machinery on February 19, 1946, for a 
period of one year (Doganis 2001; Williams 
1994) and later made it permanent in 1955 
(Doganis 2001). Thus, IATA traffic confer­
ences began to provide a multilateral link in 
the bilateral system to coordinate rate 
proposals between carriers, prior to govern­
ment review, until deregulation occurred in 
1977-78. During the period from 1946 to 
1978, IATA had been under constant criti­
cism for being a cartel with monopoly power 
to set rates and fares for international air 
transport (Taneja 1979). As a result, the 
CAB issued a show cause order proposing to 
disapprove IATA traffic conference provi­
sions and related resolutions in June 1978 
(Taneja 1979).
In 1977, the Carter administration initiated 
a chain of events that transformed the 
international air transport industry from a 
closed and protected industry to an open and 
competitive one (Doganis 2001). Although 
the Air Passenger Deregulation Act was 
passed in 1978, the air cargo industry was 
deregulated separately in the second half of 
1977.
On August 21,1978, President Jimmy Carter 
issued a comprehensive statement on 
“international air transport negotiations,” 
setting forth the U.S. policy for the conduct 
of international air transport negotiations 
(Doganis 2001). This agreement effectively 
deregulated air cargo services between 
countries by introducing a double disappro­
val regime for fares, which suggested that 
the filed tariffs became operative unless both 
governments disapproved it. In the pre­
deregulated era, double approval of fares by 
both governments was required.
By early 1990’s, it became clear to many 
countries that the “open market” bilaterals 
had not gone far enough and needed further 
liberalization (Doganis 2001). An “open 
skies” agreement was inaugurated to enable 
a new phase of international deregulation 
(Doganis 2001). The key element of this 
bilateral, with regard to cargo pricing policy, 
was that there would be no tariff controls 
except in instances where the tariff was 
leaning more towards one of the two 
extremes. In such instances, government 
intervention was advocated to protect con­
sumers from unreasonably high prices or to 
protect airlines from artificially low fares due 
to government subsidies (Doganis 2001). 
With the above-mentioned objective and 
others favoring true liberalization, the 
Clinton administration, in April 1995, issued 
the first formal statement of international 
air transportation policy in 17 years.
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Following this statement, the United States 
prepared for a phased removal of restrictions 
and liberalization of the air service market. 
As a result, on tariffs, double disapproval or 
the country of origin rule was replaced by the 
decision that government should not inter­
fere in tariff setting, except in extreme in­
stances to prevent discriminatory practices. 
However, published international fares still 
continue to be established through the rate 
setting machinery of IATA.
Air freight services are now sold and 
marketed in a variety of ways by line haul 
operators, integrators, and freight 
forwarders (Williams 1994). The line haul 
operators sell only a small proportion of their 
cargo space directly to customers. The 
greater proportion of their cargo space is sold 
through freight forwarders and agents who 
negotiate a fixed amount of space with the 
airlines. The freight forwarders and agents 
then sell the freight space to customers. The 
line haul carriers publish their cargo rates at 
IATA tariff conferences. On the other hand, 
integrated operators offer a variety of pro­
ducts and services, depending upon the 
weight of the consignment and delivery 
speed required by shippers.
Air cargo rates, irrespective of the operator 
(line-haul, integrated operators, or freight 
forwarders) providing the service, are 
determined on the basis of a number of char­
acteristics and circumstances, including the 
nature of the commodity, cargo volume, 
density, weight, routing season, regularity of 
shipments, nature of transport (imports or 
exports), priority and speed of delivery 
(Williams 1994; Frankel 1982). Discounts on 
cargo rates are widely applied and are based 
on the volume of cargo transported and the 
regularity of the customer. However, air 
cargo rates tend to vary a great deal based 
upon the nature of the commodity and its
destination (Williams 1994). This rate 
variation can be attributed to three main 
factors that differentiate the airline industry 
from other industries. These factors include 
total dependence of an airline’s productivity 
on its fleet, the large percentage of operating 
costs not in control of the airline, and the 
inability of an airline’s output (cargo space) 
to be inventoried (Williams 1994).
International Ocean Transport 
Regulation and Cargo Pricing
U.S. international ocean shipping is carried 
out in U.S. owned flag vessels, U.S. owned 
foreign flag vessels, and in foreign owned, 
foreign flag vessels. U.S. flag shipping is 
usually conducted in ships built and owned 
by U.S. citizens and is comprised of tramp, 
liner, proprietary, and independent shipping 
(Federal Maritime Commission 2000).
Tramp shipping involves transporting mostly 
one general, dry, or liquid bulk commodity 
per voyage. Liner shipping, on the other 
hand, involves carrying a wide range of cargo 
from a number of shippers per voyage. 
Proprietary shipping is usually employed in 
the transport of a particular commodity and 
is operated on behalf of a single economic in­
terest (Federal Maritime Commission 2000). 
Independent shipping generally consists of 
dry or liquid bulk carriers chartered by 
independent owners for a specific voyage or 
time period on behalf of a particular firm 
(Thomchick 2000; Federal Maritime Com­
mission 2000).
The ocean shipping industry has undergone 
many changes from the early 1900’s until 
today. In the early 1910’s in the United 
States, the ocean shipping industry was 
largely self-regulated through organizations 
of carriers in each trade route called 
conferences that dominated liner trading
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(Thomchick 2000; Federal Maritime Com­
mission 2000). These conferences set rates 
and influenced indirectly the number of 
sailings in a particular route.
Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916 to 
define the provisions for the operation of 
ocean shipping conferences (Thomchick 2000). 
This act extended immunity to those agree­
ments that were filed with and approved by 
an independent regulatory agency that 
eventually became the Federal Maritime 
Commission (FMC) by executive order in 1961. 
However, the practices of carriers that were 
considered to be anti-competitive were curbed.
In the first half of the 1900’s, carriers forced 
shippers to be loyal for a certain period of 
time in order to get a reduced rate on ship­
ments called deferred rebates. The Shipping 
Act outlawed deferred rebates to shippers 
(Federal Maritime Commission 2000). Carriers 
were also prohibited from making unfair 
contracts with shippers based on the volume 
of cargo offered. Every carrier and conference 
of carriers in international commerce were 
required to file a schedule of rates and 
charges with the FMC, which ruled that the 
rates actually charged must be in compliance 
with the schedule filed (Brooks 2000). Dual 
rate contracts, contracts in which a shipper 
gets a lower rate if he/she promises all or a 
fixed percentage of cargo to a carrier or 
conference of carriers, were permitted (Thom­
chick 2000; Federal Maritime Commission 
2000). However, they were subject to the 
approval of the FMC.
In 1978, Congress passed the Ocean 
Shipping Act as an amendment to the 
Shipping Act of 1916 (Federal Maritime 
Commission 2000). This act prohibited 
carriers from maintaining rates and tariffs
below the level filed with the FMC. The 
Shipping Act of 1916, though amended 
numerous times, continued to be the major 
U.S. maritime legislation governing ocean 
shipping conference operations until 1984. 
The Shipping Act of 1984 retained anti-trust 
immunity for ocean conferences, but still 
required carriers to file rates and charges 
with the FMC (Thomchick 2000). Carriers 
were finally allowed to enter into inde­
pendent agreements with shippers outside 
conferences, but were still required to obtain 
approval from the conferences for such an 
agreement. This act prohibited the adoption 
of dual rates.
The next noteworthy legislation in the area 
was the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1995 
that attempted to eliminate tariff and 
contract filing with the FMC, as well as 
government tariff enforcement and regula­
tion (Thomchick 2000; Lewis 2000). This act 
was replaced by the Ocean Shipping Reform 
Act (OSRA) of 1998.
In May 1999, OSRA took effect (Thomchick 
2000; Lewis 2000), representing a logical 
continuation of the trend toward deregu­
lation established by the Shipping Act of 
1984 (Kendall 1986). OSRA introduced a new 
era of one-to-one confidential service con­
tracts with creative provisions aimed to 
weaken the dominance of conferences. 
Contracts must still be filed with the FMC, 
but the terms of the contract are not revealed 
to the public as before (Brooks 2000). 
Shippers are no longer able to use publicly 
filed terms of a competitor for negotiating a 
better deal with carriers. OSRA does not 
require carriers to file tariffs with the FMC, 
but requires carriers to publish tariff rates. 
The discussion of the above laws and 
regulations pertain to the liner sector of the 
ocean shipping industry.
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Ocean cargo rates are now determined on the 
basis of a number of factors, including the 
cost of owning and operating the vessel, cost 
of providing the service, value of the service 
to the owner of goods, an appropriate profit 
margin, ability of the cargo to sustain its 
transport expenditure, degree of competition, 
and prevailing economic conditions (Thorn- 
chick 2000; Button and Stough 2000). 
Although these factors provide a general 
basis for arriving at a rate for transporting 
cargo, different approaches to pricing are 
evident in the tramp and liner shipping 
sectors.
Tramp shipping transports a single commod­
ity like coal, grain, ore, or phosphate rock per 
voyage. Since tramp shipping deals mostly 
with one shipper and one commodity per 
voyage, all the costs of operating the ship, 
cargo handling, port fees and harbor dues are 
added to the capital charges of vessel owner­
ship, overheads and administration expenses 
(Thomchick 2000; Button and Stough 2000). 
The total of these costs is calculated in pro­
portion to the number of tons to be hauled. 
Thus, cargo rates in tramp shipping are 
mainly dictated by demand/supply conditions 
existing in the market (Thomchick 2000; 
Button and Stough 2000).
The liner sector, on the other hand, carries a 
wide range of cargo from a number of 
shippers per voyage. Therefore, rate struc­
tures in the liner sector are more complex 
than in the tramp sector. Liner rates are 
usually based on the stowage factor and the 
amount of vessel space occupied by the cargo. 
If a cargo has a stowage factor less than 40, 
then it does not utilize the space in the vessel 
efficiently (Thomchick 2000). The liner 
operator has the right to charge the shipper 
either on the basis of weight or measure, 
whichever yields the highest revenue. Also, 
since liner shipping involves carrying a wide
variety of cargo, rates can be quoted per 
linear foot, per head, per thousand feet, per 
barrel, and so on (Thomchick 2000; Button 
and Stough 2000).
Surcharges are often applied to liner cargo 
rates on certain occasions to help cover short­
term economic conditions, including the 
adverse effects of fuel price increases, insur­
ance rate increases, currency fluctuations, 
and trade imbalances (Button and Stough 
2000). These surcharges are applied regard­
less of the method (tariffs or service contracts) 
employed for determining the price for 
transporting the cargo. When tariff pricing is 
adopted, shippers do not have the advantage 
of negoti ating a favorable price with the 
carriers, since published tariff rates must not 
be changed. If service cont racts are employed, 
shippers reserve the right to negotiate a 




The design of the sampling methodology 
involved surveying firms that ship goods 
internationally via either air or ocean trans­
port. The sampling technique employed for 
conducting this research was convenience 
sampling. The sample was chosen from a 
group of firms with which the faculty in the 
Smeal College of Business Administration 
has business relationships. A sample of 12 
firms that are international shippers of goods 
was chosen.
Survey Instrument
The survey instrument was a structured 
questionnaire consisting of 17 questions. Most 
of the survey questions were left open-ended in 
an attempt to avoid restricting information
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from the respondents. The main focus of each 
survey was to identify the price negotiation 
strategies adopted by the firm while negoti­
ating with its air or ocean carriers.
Survey Technique
The survey technique involved initially 
contacting all the firms that comprised the 
sample via phone to briefly describe the 
purpose of the survey. This was then 
followed by sending out questionnaires via e- 
mail. From the twelve firms in the sample, 
only seven firms responded to the email 
survey. No follow-up contacts were made. 
Though only seven firms responded to the 
survey, the authors believe the quality of the 
data and the integrity of the questionnaire 
are high. By using this approach, it was 
possible to identify the most appropriate 
individuals in the firms who could provide 
the requested information.
Demographics of the Sample
All the respondents were manufacturing 
firms that are international shippers of goods 
using either air, ocean, or both for trans­
porting goods. All the firms in the sample 
spend an average of at least $7 million on 
transportation per year. The goods trans­
ported by the respondents included medical, 
consumer, electronic, paper, glass, chemical, 
and computer products.
STUDY RESULTS
Strategies Adopted by Shippers in 
International Air Transport 
Negotiations
The process of international air cargo 
distribution has undergone noteworthy 
changes in the past couple of decades due to 
the deregulation of the air industry and the
ubiquitous emphasis placed on lean produc­
tion methods and supply chain management 
techniques. Transporting cargo by air has 
gained importance in this changing environ­
ment since air offers a faster and more 
reliable mode of transport than that offered 
by ocean.
The study data indicate that air was used for 
transporting finished goods that had high 
intrinsic value per ton/kilo/pound. Air was 
also used for transporting goods that were 
originally shipped by ocean, when shipments 
were to he expedited. Many firms indicated 
that, for cargo that could move either by air 
or ocean, the mode was selected based on the 
value of the product, type of product, service 
level, critical nature of the freight, transit 
time, time available to reach the market­
place, and cost of the material in the supply 
chain. In certain firms, the mode of transport 
was determined by affiliates in foreign 
countries. The decision process in those firms 
was influenced by product availability, 
weight/volume of the product determining 
the freight cost, transit time, and expected 
time of arrival of the product at the 
destination.
The carrier for transporting the product was 
selected from a variety of sources across 
firms. These sources include trade journals, 
solicitations, networking through the 
international trade industry, on-line auction 
process, recommendations from other firms, 
and carriers already in use. The air cargo 
carriers identified through various sources 
were then short listed based on their ability 
to satisfy certain service requirements. The 
strategies adopted for selecting the carriers 
varied from one firm to another with the 
process being influenced by numerous factors. 
Some firms identified their service require­
ments and weighed these requirements 
against the cargo carrying capacity of the
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carriers. All the carriers with adequate cargo 
carrying capacity to meet the shipping 
requirements of the firm were short listed. 
These short listed carriers were then weighed 
against various secondary factors and the 
carrier that best met all of the service 
requirements of the shipper was finally 
selected.
Other firms identified and short listed those 
carriers that were willing to enter into long 
term partnerships or global alliances. These 
carriers were then weighed against several 
other secondary factors and the carrier with 
the ability to provide the best service in 
terms of all the factors required by the shipper 
was selected. A limited number of respondents 
placed primary emphasis on the experience of 
the carrier in the industry and the overall 
service provided.
The secondary factors that influenced the 
carrier selection process include frequency of 
service, price, transit time, infrastructure, 
financial stability, size, delivery capabilities, 
ability to consolidate volumes over various 
trade lanes, and quality of the overall service 
provided. Service provided by the carrier was 
considered the most important factor in the 
carrier selection process by most respon­
dents. Many firms are now focusing more on 
customer service and inventory management 
techniques, and this may be the cause for the 
additional emphasis placed on service by the 
shipping firms. Price of the service provided 
was considered the second most important 
factor by some firms while transit time was 
regarded as the next important factor after 
service by most firms.
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, 
technology played an important role in the 
carrier selection process in a number of firms. 
The carriers are now selected based upon
their ability to provide on-line bookings, on­
line cargo tracking, and the ability to create 
shipper issued commercial invoices via 
Electronic Data Interchange.
Thus, each shipping firm has a primary 
criterion for short listing the air cargo 
carriers that operated in the market. All the 
carriers that satisfied the primary criterion 
were then evaluated on their ability to 
satisfy other requirements of the firm. The 
carrier that satisfied both the primary and 
secondary criteria to the maximum possible 
extent was selected. The carrier selection 
process in each firm was very detailed and 
based upon the performance of carriers on a 
variety of aspects.
Following the carrier selection process, the 
shippers negotiated with the selected carrier 
on a number of issues. These negotiations 
were conducted on a centralized basis in all 
the firms that responded to the survey. 
Although negotiations were conducted on a 
centralized basis, many firms regionalized 
the negotiations based on the diverse 
requirements of subsidiaries in each region.
The negotiations were handled by different 
departments in each firm. In certain firms, 
the negotiations were handled by a common 
department called either, “World Wide Distri­
bution Procurement,” “Corporate Logistics,” or 
“International Transportation Department.” 
Other firms had separate departments 
handling negotiations for each of the modes. 
Some of the firms that responded had different 
departments that conducted negotiations for 
inbound and outbound shipments. The depart­
ments that handled inbound negotiations in 
some firms are either called “Global Sourcing” 
or “Inbound Team,” and the departments that 
handled outbound negotiations are either 
called “Logistics” or “Customer Focus Group.”
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Although price was considered to be the only 
factor in the negotiations between shippers 
and carriers, negotiations were conducted on 
several other factors as well. While, for 
certain shippers, service was the most impor­
tant negotiating factor, for others, a variety 
of factors were on equal par when negotia­
tions were conducted. However, all the firms 
negotiated on a variety of issues with their 
carriers, including overall service provided, 
frequency of service, price, transit times, 
liability, reporting capabilities, accessorial 
fees and surcharges, trade lanes, and length 
of contract. In some firms, the length of the 
contract with the carrier was determined 
based upon a number of factors, such as the 
number of trade lanes served, terms of re­
negotiation, and value added services 
provided. A limited number of respondents 
also placed emphasis on guaranteed cargo 
space, type of equipment used, equipment 
availability, cargo tracking capabilities, and 
performance metrics during the negotiating 
process. The negotiations were also 
conducted on the ability of the carrier to
establish electronic links with freight for­
warders to obtain cargo status, to ensure a 
proactive approach in identifying cargo 
delays, to provide automated pre-alert in­
formation to the customer, to identify 
opportunities to allow for pre-clearance of 
cargo, and to provide multiple service options 
for each lane.
The shipping firms adopted different 
strategies to arrive at an affordable price 
while negotiating with the carriers, as 
depicted in Figure 1. Every firm that 
responded to the survey employed more than 
one negotiation strategy. These price 
negotiation strategies included entering into 
long term agreements, concentrating on re­
lationship building measures, leveraging 
volume to reduce price, floating bids to get a 
competitive price from the existing base of 
carriers, consolidation of various lanes, 
density factors, size of the carrier, financial 
stability, and alliances the carriers had with 
other lines.
FIGURE 1
PRICE NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY SHIPPERS
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Some shipping firms also opted to employ 
overseas resources of the carriers to satisfy 
the needs and requirements of their cus­
tomers. This, in turn, provided the carrier 
with potential opportunities in foreign 
countries, which resulted in a reduction in the 
service price for the shipper. During the 
negotiation process, certain firms identified 
opportunities to simplify the documentation 
process in an attempt to reduce handling fees. 
Thus, several potential opportunities to reduce 
the price without hurting overall service are 
explored during the negotiation process. 
Shippers and carriers also use the negotiating 
table to explore opportunities that would 
benefit both the parties from the relationship.
Strategies Adopted by Shippers in 
International Ocean Transport 
Negotiations
The ocean shipping industry has undergone 
many changes as well due to maritime dereg­
ulation culminating in OSRA, which took 
effect in May 1999. OSRA has replaced 
conferences that once dominated the liner 
shipping industry with confidential contracts 
between shippers and carriers. This change 
has enabled carriers to collaborate on a 
variety of issues while maintaining their free­
dom and flexibility to conduct business with 
shippers on a one-to-one basis.
A major portion of the physical distribution of 
international freight is still carried by ocean 
with air being used only for the transport of 
high value, low-bulk items and when ship­
ments need to be expedited. Although all of 
the respondents in the study used both air 
and ocean for transporting goods globally, 
around 75 to 95 percent of the overall volume 
of cargo they transported was carried by the 
ocean mode.
There was no difference whatsoever in the 
strategies adopted by the respondents in the 
carrier selection process between the two 
different modes. As in the air mode of 
transport, the respondents required the ocean 
carrier also to possess technological capabili­
ties to provide on-line ocean bills of lading and 
on-line cargo tracking, in addition to other 
general abilities required. Technology is fast 
emerging as a vital factor in the carrier 
selection process, regardless of the mode 
employed for transporting the products.
Shippers conducted negotiations with the 
selected carrier on a variety of aspects, 
including price, overall service, frequency of 
service, length of contract, and trade lanes. 
The strategies adopted by shipping firms 
while negotiating price with the carriers was 
similar to those adopted while negotiating 
price with air cargo carriers. Thus, all the 
firms that responded to the survey adopted 
the same approach while selecting their 
carriers, regardless of the mode they operated 
in, and employed similar strategies while 
negotiating with them on various aspects.
These negotiations were conducted on a 
centralized basis, and the department that 
handled these negotiations varied from one 
firm to another. OSRA had completely altered 
the manner in which shipping firms negoti­
ated with their carriers. Shippers are now 
placing additional emphasis on overall service 
provided, rather than on price alone, as was 
done in the period prior to OSRA.
All the respondents that ship goods by ocean 
after the inception of OSRA move them under 
service contracts. Many shipping firms share 
the opinion that the contracts to/from the U.S. 
after OSRA are more similar to contracts 
outside the U.S. There is also mention about
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the increase in the number of contracts with 
multiple trade lanes after the passage of 
OSRA.
The negotiation process after OSRA became 
effective is purely confidential, thereby making 
the process highly competitive. Shippers are 
now entering into long term agreements with 
carriers to obtain leverage on the price based 
on the volume of cargo transported. Some of 
the respondents have reduced their carrier 
base by approximately 50 percent after the 
passage of OSRA, and are focusing their 
efforts in building relationships with a limited 
base of carriers. Conferences and conference 
contracts have become less meaningful in the 
post-OSRA environment, paving the way for 
individual agreements with strong emphasis 
on relationship building.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
There is no doubt that both the air and ocean 
industry have witnessed significant changes 
after the ‘open skies’ bilateral and OSRA, 
respectively, became effective. These changes 
have in turn brought about changes in the 
way shippers and carriers in each of the 
modes conduct business with each other. This 
research has attempted to identify the influ­
ence of these and prior regulatory changes in 
the operations of both the industries, espe­
cially in pricing, and the strategies adopted by 
shippers and carriers in the wake of these 
recent developments.
The “open skies” bilateral completely elimin­
ated tariff controls in the air industry and 
attempted to increase the variety of price and 
service options for shippers. Government inter­
vention in pricing was virtually eliminated, 
paving the way for free pricing. On the other 
hand, in the ocean shipping industry, OSRA 
brought about a new approach of one-to-one
confidential contracts between shippers and 
carriers, thereby attempting to weaken the 
dominance of conferences in rate fixing. These 
deregulation reforms have ensured a signifi­
cant transformation in the operations of both 
the industries which are outlined below.
After the “open skies” bilateral came into 
effect in the air industry, firms are now 
shipping most of their air cargo under 
contracts. In a similar fashion, the once 
traditional liner shipping industry has now 
moved closer to embracing confidential agree­
ments with shippers since the inception of 
OSRA. Many of the conferences have dis­
solved in the wake of OSRA. Now, more than 
80 percent (Brooks 2000)of ocean cargo moves 
under service contracts with tariffs being 
employed only on a very limited basis for 
small or one time shipments.
Shippers in both modes now have the freedom 
to select carriers based upon their ability to 
provide the required service. New develop­
ments in technology have forced many 
shippers to conduct their operations in an e- 
business environment in an attempt to adapt 
to the changes in the marketplace. This has 
resulted in the evolution of an interesting 
trend in the carrier selection process that 
requires carriers to use electronic purchasing 
tools such as Request-For-Information (RFI) 
and Request-For-Pricing (RFP), to make them 
eligible for selection. In addition, shippers are 
now selecting carriers based upon their ability 
to provide on-line bookings, on-line tracking of 
shipments, and on-line ocean bills of lading. 
Although each business has different needs, 
priorities, and buying strategies, shippers 
that employ these cutting edge technological 
tools select carriers that have the ability to 
conduct business electronically.
At present, negotiations are conducted on a 
variety of issues including service, price, and
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trade lanes. In certain firms, negotiations are 
conducted on a centralized basis while in 
others they are conducted on a decentralized 
basis. Each firm employs a different strategy 
for getting an affordable price from carriers. 
Many large multinational corporations lever­
age their collective tonnage to receive the 
lowest possible freight rates and the best 
service in terms of transit times and cargo 
space. An emerging trend now is that of 
measuring the performance of carriers on 
certain Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s), 
such as cargo tracking capabilities, transit 
time, and frequency of service that were 
agreed during the negotiation process. These 
KPI’s are used to evaluate the performance of 
a carrier and to either award or terminate 
business.
The negotiation strategies adopted by firms 
continue to evolve based upon the service 
requirements of the shipper and the ability of 
the carrier to meet those needs. In these 
circumstances, a further liberalization in both 
the air and ocean industry would mean more 
changes in the operation of both the industries.
The airline industry at present is moving 
toward “clear skies” bilaterals, aimed at re­
moving the existing constraints on airline 
ownership by foreign nationals, and certain 
other provisions that pertain mostly to air 
passenger transport. Within the first decade 
of this millennium, the ownership and 
investment rules are most likely going to be 
liberalized (Thomchick 2000). It would be 
valuable to identify the changes that these 
provisions of “clear skies” bilaterals will have 
on the way operations and negotiations are 
conducted in the air cargo industry.
The ocean shipping industry has witnessed 
big changes since OSRA became effective. 
Some conferences have disbanded, paving 
the way for individual discussion agreements
between shipper and carrier. In the future, it 
is expected that the remaining conferences 
will also disappear due to the fact that they 
cannot satisfy the demands of multinational 
shippers for global service contracts encom­
passing multiple trade lanes. In addition, 
more than 80 percent (Brooks 2000) of ocean 
cargo moves under service contracts and 
tariffs are adopted only on a very limited 
basis. This has also contributed to the decline 
of conferences. In future, OSRA may eventu­
ally eliminate tariffs, giving prominence only 
to confidential one-to-one contracts between 
shippers and carriers. In these circumstances, 
it would be highly intriguing to find out the 
changes in strategies adopted by shippers and 
carriers in ocean transport while negotiating 
with each other.
FUTURE RESEARCH
A small sample was selected based on 
convenience, keeping the time frame short 
for the completion of the study. A more 
detailed study with a larger sample, strati­
fied on the basis of the amount wspent for 
international transportation of goods per 
year, might have yielded more information. 
This might also have provided information on 
any differences, if any, in the carrier selec­
tion process and price negotiation strategies 
employed by small, medium, and large inter­
national shipping firms.
The e-mail survey method was chosen for its 
efficiency and convenience in contacting 
respondents within a short time frame. 
However, this method might have limited 
the volume and detail of information 
provided by the respondents. Personal inter­
views may have resulted in more detailed 
replies.
Future research on this topic could use a 
stratified sample based upon the amount
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spent for international shipping of goods per would provide more information that may 
year and employ personal interviews. This not have been revealed by this study.
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